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In the 1970s feminist legal theory furthered feminist legal practice.
Feminist lawyers saw themselves as advocates of ''women's rights,"
interested in winning legal victories in particular cases. Because
their attention was focused on reform through legislation or litigation, the theory they developed was deliberately, if uncritically,
grounded in what would be persuasive to those who held power in
government institutions. They built directly upon the precedent
made in race cases, precedent which assumed that the appropriate
goal for social change was equality and defined equality as the similar treatment of similarly situated individuals. The key to the early
legal victories 1 of the second wave was the assertion that women
and men are similarly situated for all legally relevant purposes.
In the last decade, however, feminist jurisprudence has become
less interested in arguing to judges. Instead, its attention has turned
to the critique of law itself as a construct of patriarchy. As a practical matter this shift was provoked by the apparent deficiencies of
the ostensibly neutral, formal equality strategy in cases involving
problems, like pregnancy, that judges thought reflected bedrock
biological differences between women and men. 2 Legal scholars, influenced by feminist critical theory in other disciplines, began to
ask whether the standard methods of legal analysis necessarily
distort what is at stake for women. In a move that parallels the
feminist criticism of science, these scholars challenge the assumption that law establishes a neutral procedural framework that provides a fair hearing for all points of view.
One significant body of work within this critical movement argues that sex is not an issue that can be made to disappear through
gender-neutral methods of analysis. This scholarship builds on the
insights of Catharine MacKinnon, the only feminist legal theorist
to come up with a unifying theory independent from legal precedent and the only one whose work has had a wide readership beyond the profession. 3 MacKinnon challenges the assumption that
answers are to be found by comparing women to men. She argues
that discrimination against women is based on dominance, rather
than distinction, and that the key to understanding male dominance lies in the social construction of sexuality from a male perspective. The social meaning of sex as pleasurable for both sexes
when men dominate and women submit justifies gender hierarchy. Women are seen as naturally subordinate in this most basic
of biological activities and, by extension, naturally subordinate as
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political beings. Sex between women and men, which MacKinnon
sees as coerced in fact but socially described as t:onsensual,
becomes for her the central subject of jurisprudential inquiry because it explains why sex inequality can be seen by law as the consequence of free individual choice. 4
Examples of the way in which MacKinnon's work has influenced
legal scholarship can be found in the legal reform work of Susan
Estrich, the deconstructive work of Frances Olsen, and the more
ambivalent, personally exploratory work of Robin West. Estrich
fits within the tradition of the 1970s in that she argues for specific
changes in legal rules, but when she writes about rape her central
theme is the way in which criminal law has constructed sexual coercion as consent. Estrich also departs from earlier strategies for
legal reform in her explicit rejection of objectivity and abstraction.
She begins her discussions with a description of her own rape, and
she goes beyond legal doctrinal analysis to the wider context of the
reporting, investigation, prosecution, and disposition of rape cases.
Unlike MacKinnon, Estrich is willing to adopt the language of consent. She would have the law find lack of consent when a woman
has expressly refused to engage in intercourse ("No means no'!) or
when her consent was coerced by threats or misrepresentation.
This would leave unpunished those rapes in which consent or silence was coerced by more subtle means, but it would go beyond
what is currently possible in the prosecution of rape by nonstrangers. Because Estrich is primarily interested in legal change,
she has written her basic argument in two forms to two audiences,
neither of which is the larger feminist community. Her work on
rape initially appeared as a lengthy law review article addressed to
lawyers5 and was subsequently repackaged as a book, Real Rape,
addressed to a lay audience. Although the article adopts the standard law-review format in that it consists of an extended discussion of cases and legislation, Estrich uses these materials to create
a powerful narrative of the exclusion of the woman victim's perspective. Her theme throughout is that consent and coercion are
defined from a male point of view. Criminal law has:required, for
example, that force be resisted in the way that men would respond
to male aggression. And the due process concern that a defendant
not be unfairly punished is exaggerated inappropriately-by the male
fear that women will cry rape. Although the book is addressed to a
lay audience, it is in some ways less exciting than the article. The
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argument is more tightly written, focused on the problem of date
rape, and Estrich carefully avoids the explicit feminism and anger
that permeates the article. Real Rape is designed to persuade
legislators to make changes that will facilitate the prosecution of
date rape without requiring that they accept Estrich's more fundamental challenges to the way in which male perspectives are
embedded in the criminal justice system.
Frances Olsen writes within the tradition of critical legal studies,
which has challenged the consistency and coherence of the rightsbased analysis that was used to achieve the early victories of the
"women's rights" movement. Olsen's most powerful article may be
"Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis," which
analyzes Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County. 6 In that
case the Supreme Court upheld a sex-based statutory rape statute
against an equal protection challenge. Olsen demonstrates how
any approach to the case threatens women: upholding statutory
rape law provides security for some women while intruding on
the autonomy of others who are not allowed to consent to sex;
striking the laws down furthers autonomy at the expense of security when consent is coerced. The trouble, Olsen suggests, is that,
under present circumstances, the interests of some women would
be best served by stressing autonomy, but other women would be
best served by stressing security. Indeed, a particular woman
might well be oppressed by both sexual freedom and societal control of her sexuality,. She might be subject to coerced sex that does
not fit the legal definition of rape and yet be prohibited from other
activities on the grounds of her sexual vulnerability.7 To treat
women as autonomous bearers of legal rights ignores MacKinnon's
insight into the way consent is coerced. Michael M. provides a case
study that demonstrates how legal argument forces advocates to
reach premature foreclosure. The answer, according to Olsen, is
not to give up on law but to give up on the effort to achieve
credibility with judges by articulating principles that purport to
decide all cases for all time. Feminist lawyers should make explicitly political choices and challenge those particular rules that
have most pernicious effects at any given time.
Olsen's work demonstrates that feminist insights, the introduction of the perspectives of women, can be done in a way that is
compatible with and continuous with the best sort of legal analytic
reasoning. Lawyers have always dealt with precedent through
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close textual reading that searches for unsupported assumptions
and suppressed inconsistencies. Olsen turns these techniques to
self-consciously political purposes in her critique of the arguments
made by the Supreme Court, by lawyers, by feminists, and by
feminist lawyers. She demonstrates not only that each argument
leaves some important interests out but also that a particular position may actually interfere with the ability of the advocate to see
what has happened to the real woman in the real case. She points
out, for example, that another feminist scholar, who advocates
gender-neutral laws, characterizes the rape in Michael M. as a "victimless crime" even though the adolescent defendant in that case
sought the consent of the victim by slugging her in the face.
Olsen's work builds explicitly on MacKinnon's. Robin West's
scholarship is more deeply ambivalent about MacKinnon's contribution, but its very preoccupations demonstrate the way in which
issues of sexuality and dominance have become central to feminist
jurisprudence. West, like Olsen, has been very prolific. I will discuss only two of her articles here. In "Jurisprudence and Gender,"
West argues that both liberal rights-based theory and critical legal
theory are premised upon a definition of ''human being" that is inapplicable to women. Both theories regard humans as fundamentally separate from each other, but women, West claims, are
not in fact physically individuated from other people. Women,
unlike men, "are in some sense 'connected' to life and to other
human beings during at least four recurrent and critical material
experiences": pregnancy, heterosexual penetration, menstruation,
and breastfeeding. Although West acknowledges that not all
women have all these experiences, she argues that most women
are forced into them by male power disguised as biological imperative. In this respect she builds on MacKinnon, and, perhaps
more than MacKinnon, 8 West appears to assume that these fundamental experiences are the same for all women despite race,
class, and even sexual preference. West differs from MacKinnon
in that she has a positive as well as a negative view of sexuality:
the "potentiality for physical connection with others that uniquely
characterizes women's lives has within it the seeds of 'both intimacy and invasion" (p. 53). MacKinnon accurately describes women's experience, West says, but so do her opponents who describe
sex as pleasurable and affirming; each describes one side of the
fundamental contradiction inherent in the material condition of
women.
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West's approach is reassuring to those who feel uncomfortable
w~th MacKinnon's emphasis on sex as inevitably coerced. It provides a less political, way to understand the strategic tensions
described by Olsen. And it is particularly powerful in describing
why a woman's perspective on such issues as rape and abortion
may not be captured by legal concepts of autonomy and independence: 'The fear of sexual and fetal invasion and intrusion is the
fear of being occupied from within, not annihilated from without ...
of having one's own physical and material life taken over by the
pressing physical urgency of another, not ended by conflicting interests of another... "(p. 41). West claims to provide a means of
reconciling "cultural feminists" like Carol Gilligan and "radical feminists" like Catharine MacKinnon. But much of the apparent force
of her approach ·is attributable to the reductive way in which she
describes the positions of others, and the reconciliation she claims
to achieve may be simply schizophrenic. :That possibility becomes
apparent in a second, more personal, and very thought-provoking
article ponderously titled "The Difference in Women's Hedonic
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist l\,egal Theory."
"The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives" is divided into two
parts. In the first part, West uses examples from >her own life to
demonstrate that women's suffering is invisible tQ men because
men lack similar experiences and because women are_taught either
to deny pain or to regard it as inevitable or pleasurable. -The. examples West uses are promiscuity, physically abusive relationships, and street harassment. Much of this material is powerfully
supportive of MacKinnon's point that sex is socially constructed in
ways that are destructive to women. But the second part of West's
essay takes MacKinnon to task for silencing women who experience pleasure in sexual submission. West takes The Story of 0
as illustrative of the way in which giving men power can further
women's pleasure. MacKinnon's approach, West argues, leads to a
feminism that ignores the "'experiential reality" that some women
feel .pleasure in pain and thus diminishes the ''hedonic" content of
women's lives. West's article is so consistently interesting and so
obviously an effort to speak honestly and directly on matters that
are seldom discussed in legal literature that it cannot be easily
dismissed. Yet it doesn't form a coherent whole. The author of part
2 seems not to have learned from the author of part 1, and vice
versa. If women are taught to lie to men and to themselves about
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the existence of pain, as West argues in part 1, how are we to use
their experience of pleasure in pain as a basis for feminist theory?
West's attempt to reconcile MacKinnon with the insights of
cultural feminism reflects the importance of Carol Gilligan, who
has been the other major influence on feminist work challenging
the accepted discourse of law. In fact, Gilligan has had an impact.
on feminist jurisprudence that may be more powerful and more
enduring than her impact on any other discipline. Legal feminists
came late to the question of difference. The constraints of litigation
led them to continue to focus on what women and men have in
common at a time when feminists elsewhere were beginning to be
preoccupied with difference. Gilligan's In a Different Voice:
Psyc'J:1.0logical Theory and Womens DevelopmenfJ was published just
at the time when legal scholars were looking for an alternative to
the gender-neutral jurisprudence of the 1970s. It seemed to provide an explanation for the alienation that many women feel while
in law school and legal practice, while suggesting that an alternative jurisprudence could be built around themes of caring, relationships, and responsibility.
Yet Gilligan's "ethic of care" has not proven to be very useful for
deciding particular cases or generating legal theory. West's effort
to bridge MacKinnon's emphasis on invasion and Gilligan's emphasis on intimacy is provocative but unsuccessful. Another ambitious but ultimately unsatisfying attempt to build from Gilligan is
Suzanna Sherry's ucivic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication."10 Sherry identifies Gilligan's "different
voice" with the tradition of civic republicanism currently enjoying
a vogue among constitutional scholars and then argues that the
opinions of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, at least when compared
to the opinions of other conservative Justices, exhibit relational
thinking in that O'Connor is particularly sensitive to the claims of
community. The result is a rather dazzling but very strained exhibition of how unlike can be made to seem (a little bit) alike. In
order to make the comparisons work to even a limited extent,
Sherry is forced to describe not only civic republicanism, but also
O'Connor and Gilligan, in the most abstract and ummodulated
terms.
A more successful, because less ambitious, effort to apply Gilligan's insights can be found in the work of Carrie Menkel-Meadow.
Menkel-Meadow, who writes about alternative dispute resolution

24

Feminist Legal Theory I

500

di

I

Ii
,f

lu

'

Christina Brooks Whitman

and the legal profession, focuses not on the substance of law but
on the role of women in legal practice. In an article written in 1985
she speculated, on the basis of Gilligan's work, that a significant increase in the numbers of women lawyers might lead to changes in
the practice and values of the law. 11 Menkel-Meadow thought
women might become "innovators and critics of the profession,"
creating, for example, a umore cooperative, less war-like" alternative to the "advocacy-adversarial model" of law and a nonhierarchical, participatory structure of law firm organization.
More recently, Menkel-Meadow admits that her own research and
that of others "seems to indicate that women in law are being
assimilated into the traditional culture of the profession rather
than bringing . . . innovations" IP• 313). 12 A major strength of
Menkel-Meadow's work is her care not to claim too much. She is
not insensitive to the dangers of perpetuating stereotypes and
takes pains to stress that she is talking about socially created differences between women and men, but she is committed as "an
act of faith" to the proposition that women will make a difference.
Her work is aspirational, self-described as an agenda for future research and an effort to encourage the development of more caring
methods of lawyering. Because it has so little upon which to build,
it is also frustratingly vague.
Menkel-Meadow does not, except in the most general sense, try
to use Gilligan's work to decide substantive questions. Martha
Minow's recent book, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law does exactly that. It is an ambitious effort
at synthesis. Minow combines Gilligan's insights with American
pragmatism, and other work in philosophy, social science, and literary criticism, to suggest that a wide range of legal questions involving difference ought to be resolved by "attention to relationships- relationships between people, between concepts, and between the observer and the observed." Minow does not limit herself to issues of gender difference but explores the ways in which
cases involving race, ethnicity, religious minorities, children, the
mentally and physically disabled, and even the separation of governmental powers can be productively resolved by attention to relationships. Her theme is that problems of difference have seemed intractable because difference has been thought to inhere in the "different' individual rather than to be a product of social construction. This mistake has led courts to ask how "special" needs can be
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accommodated into essentially unchanging environments rather
than to observe how environments create difference by unnecessary failure to be inclusive. Minow argues that we can restructure relationships to include difference. The standard feminist example of this point would be the adoption of workplace
structures and practices which assume workers have obligations to
dependent family members. Minow generates others: developing
hospital procedures that treat every patient as potentially HIVpositive; teaching sign language to the hearing students in a deaf
child's class; finding another family to care for a Down's syndrome
child whose parents are unable or unwilling to provide emotional
support.
Minow does an effective job of explaining how pragmatist and
feminist thinking can be used to challenge the "individual rights"
analysis that has dominated law. Refreshingly undogmatic,· she
does not reject rights theory in favor of relational strategies but redefines rights as "communally recognized rituals for securing attention in a continuing struggle over boundaries between people"
IP• 383). Despite the strength of her critique, however, Minow
does not ultimately succeed in formulating an alternative decisional strategy. She herself sees the problem. It is one shared by
many who have tried to articulate a theory of value based on caring: "This all sounds lovely, you may say, but awfully abstract,
What actually happens?' (p. 381). Minow's response is to generate
a series of actual case studies. They are all individually interesting
but difficult to understand as part of a common strategy. Minow's
"relational" solutions to particular problems-like, ironically, so
many of the solutions generated by economic approaches to lawseem possible only because she makes factual assumptions that
facilitate resolution. She assumes, for example, that there are
enough resources to treat all hospital patients with extraordinary
care. The deaf child appears to be in a class that is taught by a
teacher who knows or can easily learn sign language and one in
which no other disabled or disruptive students compete for
accommodation; this ideal environment will apparently be recreated year after year. In the Down's syndrome example, which
is based on actual litigation, the court has before it a family eager
to be emotional parents to the child. Every case seems to tum on
fortuities. Perhaps all Minow means to say is that the legal system
ought to be open to taking advantage of those opportunities to re-
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structure relationships that happen to exist. That is an important
point but not one that promises a dramatic transformation in how
law deals with difference.
The great temptation of legal thinking is the hope that the interests of women, like those of other groups, can be captured in a
single narrative, or formula, or three- or four-part test to be applied
to all cases. This would give litigators confidence that they are
truly representing their clients' interests, and judges would be able
to tell themselves that they are acting with appropriate neutrality.
Cases, after all, must be decided, so lawyers must teach conclusions and come up with answers. Provisional, contingent solutions
seem too political, too likely to be the result of unconscious or conscious bias. Yet feminist scholars, who have undergone their own
temptation with unitary, foundational theory, have not been able
to describe a theory that benefits some women without hurting
others. There are real differences among women, and some of
these have been exacerbated by the women's movement and its
legal victories, which achieved access to power for some while
removing traditional protections for others. 13 As Deborah L.
Rhode puts it, "we need theory without Theory."
In her recent book, Justice and Gender, Rhode, like Minow, emphasizes the broader context in which legal rules are created. But
unlike Minow, she addresses only questions involving gender and
she reaches.for no overarching method of analysis. Instead, Rhode
discusses the full range of particular legal problems involving women, placing each one in its historical, social, and economic context
before discussing the relevant judicial opinions and current legal
arguments. Rhode herself makes very few suggestions for legal
change, at least as ultimate solutions. There are aspects of this approach which are extremely frustrating. Rhode is so thorough in
explicating the full range of arguments that she seems excessively
balanced. Again and again she responds to hard questions with a
simple call for more research. But Rhode has created the first true
legal treatise on gender, and unlike most legal treatises, hers does
not limit itself to doctrine. The book is crammed with information
from secondary sources and exhaustive in describing the range of
possible legal positions. It is not a comfortable book to read from
cover to cover, largely because of its lack of a distinctive point of
view, but it is a splendid ,resource.
Some of the most exciting scholarship now being produced
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creates partial narratives.,Much of it is innovative in its use of nonlegal methods of analysis; and some departs dramatically from traditional approaches·to legal inquiry. In one tecent article·, for example, Vicki Schultz uses.statistical methods to analyze the role in
Title VII cases of employers' arguments that women are overrepresented in low-paying, low-status jobs because they are not interested in more highly rewarded work. Instead of considering each
judicial opinion as an independent, self-contained text, Schultz
looks at a data set of fifty-four cases and makes a quantitative
analysis of the relationship between argument, evidence, and outcome. She finds that courts are more willing to credit the l.rck of
interest argument when employers show that they have made
special efforts to attract women and less likely to credit it when
plaintiffs produce individual victims who can offer anecdotal
evidence o'f discrimination. Schultz concludes that courts assume
that patterns of sex segregation.are attributable either to women's
choices or to employer coercion. Judges believe that discrimination exists oply where employers refuse to hire those women who
enter the work world• with the desire to take on nontraditional
jobs. They overlook the possibility that women's choices are evolving, formed in part in reaction to structural features of employment that affect women's experience in the workplace. Relying on
sociological research which supports this latter interpretation,
Schultz proposes a new story which implicates employment practices in women's choices even when employers do not engage in
deliberate exclusion or coercion. Because she does not 'focus on
doctrinal argument but on underlying judicial assumptions about
the nonlegal world, Schultz does not discuss whether Title VII provides·an adequate vehicle for remedies against individual employers when segregation is caused by structural and cultural features
of workplace organization. But she makes a powerful case that, if
it does not provide such remedies, the statute is not responsive·to
the most serious and enduring problems of employment discrimination against women.
Schultz's work suggests that no single legal approach is adequate
because workplace exclusion operates in different ways for qifferent women. Narratives by Black feminist scholars pose a more
fundamental ,challenge, not only to the perspective of white feminist jurisprudence, 14 but also to its lack of passion. In "Sapphire
Bound!" Regina Austin, a writer who has been particularly in-
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terested in tactic& of resistance, 15 calls for a jurisprudence that
would "preach the justness of the direct, participatory, grass-roots
opposition Black women undertake" IP• 544). She.takes as her text
Chambers v. Om.aha Girls Club, 16 in which a court held that Title
VII was not violated when a girls' club, administered primarily by
whites for Black teenage girls, fired its arts and crafts instructor, an
unmarried Black woman, because she became pregnant. The dismissal was found to be justified because Chambers was a "negative
role model" for her students. Austin points out the irony of an employment practice that replicates the very condition the organization claims to address: club administrators hoped to discourage
teenage pregnancy because of the economic hardship and social
prejudice it entails, but Chambers's pregnancy was not "problematic" in this sense until she was fired. Like Schultz, Austin relies on sociological and cultural studies of the way in which structure affects individual choice. She describes adolescent pregnancy
as a response to the material conditions in which many Black teenagers live, and Chambers's adult decision to become a mother as
"an alternative social form that one might choose deliberately, rationally, and proudly" (p. 576). Role models, Austin argues, ought
to be Sapphires, affirming the perspective of less powerful Black
women rather than projecting "an assimilated person that is ... unthreatening to white people" IP• 574).
Other Black scholars have refused to conform to traditional legal
standards of politeness and coherence. Some of the most powerful
work is by Patricia Williams, who is more explicitly autobiographical than Austin. Williams's recent essays are written in a
fragmented, postmodern style that captures the contradictions of
her life as a descendant of slaves and of slaveowners who has
graduated from Harvard Law School and now teaches commercial
transactions. In "On Being the Object of Property," Williams challenges conventional legal discourse by wrenching legal concepts
away from their established meanings and using them evocatively
and metaphorically. An illusory contract, for example, becomes
not a contract in which consideration fails because it is nonexistent or unavailable but a metaphor for the way in which contract law is used to justify the brutal parting of a mother from her
children-Mary Beth Whitehead, a usurrogate" mother, from her
baby daughter; Williams's twelve-year-old great-great-grandmother, a slave raped by her owner, from her daughter, Williams's
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great-grandmother, Mary. Williams's essay is disturbing because it
is open-ended and evolving. It doesn't end with a solution. It
doesn't even formulate a problem in a form that a court could
answer. Perhaps it therefore isn't "law." But it certainly should
speak to lawyers.
Law has a tendency to marginalize, and even exclude, theories
that are tentative, ambiguous, provisional. Yet some of the most
exciting feminist jurisprudence, as well as some of the most banal,
has been explicitly open-ended. Formal rules and structured analyses are the ways in which law protects itself against favoritism
and arbitrary decision making. But feminist scholarship has found
that the dangers of legal power lie not only in bias and interest but
also in the false confidence that bias and interest have been
eliminated. Feminist jurisprudence has developed a group of
theories that can be used to critique results in particular cases and
be a powerful challenge to the rhetorical claims of the law. It has
complicated and challenged legal discussion. Its interdisciplinary
reach is impressive, although little of it is, perhaps as a consequence, strikingly original.
Yet there is a sense in which much of current feminist jurisprudence seems unmoored, directionless. Perhaps more than anywhere else, the strains of the debate over essentialism have disrupted feminist strategies in the law. The formal equality model
that accomplished so much through litigation in the "1970s cannot
be reconciled with what feminists· have come to know about the
dangers of assuming simiiarity within gender as well as across
gender lines. However, no alternative model has emerged that
avoids these dangers and successfully appeals to the constitutive
principles of our Constitution and laws. Courts are just beginning
to accept the full implications of the view that groups, as well as
individuals, can be holders of legal rights. The next, and more difficult, stage will be to retain the force of that understanding while
making a legal space for more nuanced claims about the way that
disadvantage varies within groups.

NOTES
1. In cases such as those challenging the legality under Title VII of policies that prohibit
all fertile women from certain high-paying jobs on the ground that working conditions
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are harmful to fetuses, International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196
(1991), some of these victories have come under attack. Important work is being done
by scholars such as Mary Becker, who has demonstrated the powerful similarities between these policies and early-twentieth-century protective legislation held unconstitutional in the 1970s. See Becker, "From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies,"
University of Chicago La.w Review 53 (Fall 1986): 1219-73.
.
2. See Joan Williams, "Deconstructing _Gender," Michigan La.w Review 87 (February
1989): 797-845; Lise Vogel, "Debating Difference: Feminism, Pregnancy, and the Workplace," Feminist Studies 16 (Spring 1990): 9-32.
3. Catharine MacKinnon's work over the last decade has been influenced by her col•
laboration with Andrea Dworkin, who is not a lawyer. A representative sample of
MacKinnon's speeches can be found in Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1987}; her most recent work in political theory is Toward a Feminist
Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).
For reviews in the legal literature, both positive and negative, see ~gela Harris,
"Categorical Discourse and Dominance Theoty," Berkeley Women:S La.w Journal 5
Uanuary 1990): 181-96; Frances Olsen, "Feminist Theory in Grand Style," Columbia Law
Review 89 Uune 1989): 1147-78; Christina B. Whitman, "Law anq Sex," Michigan La.w
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